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By the time Xi Jinping completed his two terms as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) in the autumn of 2022 the Party will have celebrated its 
centenary (2021), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will have outlasted the Soviet 
Union by four years. These forthcoming landmarks are important points of reference for Xi. 
As China’s leader Xi is committed to pre-empt a Soviet style implosion and to revive the 
Party and the country during his watch. The general direction to which Xi would like to take 
China is encapsulated in the China dream, which he articulated in public for the first time at 
‘the road to revival’ exhibition at the National Museum in Beijing, shortly after he took 
power in November 2012. This determination was affirmed at the Third Plenum of the 18th 
Party Congress held in November 2013. Although the Fourth Plenum (October 2014) focused 
on ‘comprehensively advancing the rule of law’, the overall objective of Xi was not 
changed.1   
 
Essentially Xi is committed to restore China to greatness by building on ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’.2 He is keenly aware of the weaknesses within the political 
                                              
1 China (2014a) ‘Communique of the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of CPC’, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/fourth_plenary_session/2014-12/02/content_34208801.htm, date 
accessed 7 August 2015. 
2 Xinhua Net (2012) Xi Jinping, ‘Chengqian qihou jiwang kailai jixu chaozhe zhonghuanminzu weida 
fuxing mubiao fenyong qianjin’, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-11/29/c_113852724.htm, date 
accessed 30 May 2013.  
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system, which makes it potentially vulnerable.  While Xi acknowledges the risk that the PRC 
could follow the footsteps of other former Communist states and implode he does not share 
the worry Party leaders had in the early 1990s. Xi exudes immense confidence in China’s 
political system and its prospect.3 To him the system is not fundamentally weak or faulted but 
it needs a good shake up and a strong leadership to function as an effective machinery for 
governance that delivers the national revival to which he is committed. The system that Xi 
has inherited is a consultative Leninist one, which took shape under the leadership of Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao. The focus of reforms in the political arena is to reinforce and 
strengthen this system, not to replace it by an alternative system such as liberal democracy or 
by a restoration of Maoist totalitarianism or by a dictatorship. 
 
The term ‘consultative Leninism’ was first used by Richard Baum in a paper 
published by the French Centre for International Studies and Research in 2007.4 I used the 
same term and developed it independently into an analytical framework for understanding the 
nature of the political system in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in an article in the 
Journal of Contemporary China in 2009.5 The same analytical framework is used in this 
chapter to assess the direction and scope of changes in the political sphere in the coming 
decade.  
 
The changes that Xi would like to introduce in the political sphere are tied closely to 
the goals encapsulated in the China Dream.  In essence it is about restoring China’s greatness 
                                              
3 Seeing Red (2013) Yu Gao, ‘Beijing Observation: Xi Jinping the Man’, 
http://seeingredinchina.com/2013/01/26/beijing-observation-xi-jinping-the-man-by-gao-yu/, date 
accessed 26 November 2013. 
4 Stephen-t (2007) Richard Baum, ‘The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience’, http://www.stephen-
t.com/pdf/the%20limits%20of%20authoritarian%20resilience%20-%20Baum.pdf, date accessed 31 
May 2013. 
5 Steve Tsang (2009) ‘Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol.18, no. 62, pp. 865-880. There are parts of this paper which are based on 
the article cited above. 
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as a rich country supported by a powerful modern military. The primary instrument to deliver 
the China Dream is the Communist Party, which Xi plans to reinvigorate through two 
mutually supportive initiatives.  The first is to revitalise the Party as a Leninist instrument of 
control and governance. The anti-corruption drive is intended primarily to deliver this, in 
addition to restoring the reputation and credibility of the Party countrywide. The revival of 
the Maoist principle of ‘the mass line’ is adopted to enable the Party to direct public opinion 
and secure public support after it has ostensibly reached out to the general public for their 
views.  The second initiative is to reassert the Party’s narrative of history and reaffirm the 
legitimacy of the Party based on its ‘great historical achievements’ with the great tragedies 
that happened under Mao appropriately contextualized.  
 
 The consultative Leninist system Xi inherited from Hu has demonstrated its 
resilience. It has withstood two generational leadership successions, in 2002 and 2012, as 
well as a major potential crisis as the global financial crisis of 2007-9 threatened to engulf 
China. The public commitment by successive leaders including Xi to deepen reform reveals 
the system’s inherent requirement that it must constantly adapt to sustain its resilience. 
 
It is a system that reaffirms the basic Leninist nature of the political system as it 
greatly strengthens its capacity to respond to public demands, shapes public opinions, and 
builds up a strong sense of national pride. While this involves introducing considerable 
changes in the political arena, this system is meant to enable the CPC to reject Western or 
liberal democracy as a model for China. ‘Chinese democracy’ as interpreted and implemented 
under Xi does not tolerate any scope for the Party to lose power. When the Party refers to 
‘political reform’ it does not imply changes that will lead to democratization as it is usually 
understood in Europe and North America. In the PRC it generally implies governance 
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changes to strengthen the capacity of the Party to rule more effectively and efficiently or 
deepen ‘socialist democracy’.  
 
 Following the analytical framework I put forth in 2009, this consultative Leninist 
system blends together the Leninist instrument of control with innovations from other 
sources.6 It has five defining characteristics: 
• The Communist Party is first and foremost focused on staying in power, for which 
maintaining stability in the country and pre-emptively eliminating threats to its 
political supremacy are deemed essential. 
• A focus on governance reform both within the Party and in the state apparatus in order 
to pre-empt public demands for democratization in the Western sense of the word. 
• A commitment to enhance the Party’s capacity to elicit, respond to and direct 
changing public opinion. 
• A commitment to sustain rapid growth and economic development by whatever 
means and, where the party leadership deems politically expedient. 
• The promotion of a brand of nationalism that integrates a sense of national pride in a 
tightly guided narrative that stresses the greatness of China’s history and its 
civilization under the leadership of the Party. 
 
Preservation of Party Leadership 
 
 Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the Party reaffirms its right to rule in China on the 
basis that it will transform the China Dream from rhetoric into reality.  The provision in the 
state constitution for the Party to play the leading role in the PRC remains the basic principle 
                                              
6 Ibid., p. 866. 
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that underpins the political system.7 Xi is determined that the party will continue as the 
‘vanguard party’ and ‘guardian of the people’. As such he will ensure the Party maintains, 
indeed, strengthens its long standing capacity to deal with dissent as well as devises and 
implements a development model that seeks to deliver growth, employment, stability, order, 
prosperity and improved governance for the ordinary people. Under Xi, the CPC will keep its 
Leninist structure, ethos and organizational principles and will remain totally dedicated to 
staying in power and exercising supervision over the state institutions and the media.  
 
Notwithstanding expectations that the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee 
(2013) would usher in a new phase of reform, there is a strong continuity with the pattern set 
in the last two decades.  With the passing of Deng Xiaoping as the last strong man in the PRC 
in 1997, Jiang Zemin stressed that ‘The whole Party must always maintain the spirit of 
advancing with the times and constantly extend Marxist theory into new realms … give top 
priority to development in governing and invigorating the country and constantly break new 
ground and open up a new prospect in the modernization drive… [and] improve its Party 
building in a spirit of reform and constantly inject new vitality into itself. 8 This marked the 
start of consultative Leninism. Xi is just as committed to making the Party adapt in order to 
stay in power. This is to be achieved, when the general conditions in the country are benign, 
by the Party supervising the government machinery in delivering improvements in 
governance, strengthening the authorities’ narrative of developments in the country, reaching 
out to the general public, redressing public grievances and improving living conditions.  
 
In the leadership change year of 2012, there were strong pent-up public discontent 
                                              
7 English People (1982) Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html, date accessed 2 June 2014. 
8 English CPC (2006) ‘Three Represents’, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html, date 
accessed 2 June 2014. 
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over the scale and reach of corruption which caught public imagination as the powerful leader 
of Chongqing and Politburo member Bo Xilai was removed from office.9 Xi clearly saw this 
as a major challenge to the Party’s governance capacity as corruption is highly corrosive of 
the Party’s Leninist discipline and therefore its ability to respond to challenges effectively. It 
is also damaging to the Party’s credibility and legitimacy. Hence, Xi took up the anti-
corruption cause as soon as he took over power by promptly appointing Wang Qishan, widely 
seen as the member of the new Politburo Standing Committee most able to tackle corruption, 
to spearhead such a campaign.10 While it is questionable whether the anti-corruption drive 
will be able to eradicate systemic corruption, it already has a powerful salutary effect in 
dramatically curbing lavish official entertainment and ostentatious display of ill-gotten wealth 
by officials at all levels.11  The anti-corruption drive is essentially part of a party rectification 
operation designed to reinvigorate the consultative Leninist system, something Xi will keep 
going or even institutionalise; it should not be seen as a political campaign, which always 
gets wound down after a period of time.   
 
The anti-corruption policy should reduce and contain the abuse of power but it will 
not change the nature of the political system. Indeed, the resultant enhancement to the 
governance capacity and credibility of the Party is meant to pre-empt popular demand for 
liberal democracy or constitutionalism.12 Under Xi, the Party will sustain a benevolent and 
efficient monopoly of power while it practises democratic centralism. As a consultative 
                                              
9 SCMP (2012) AFP, ‘Anti-corruption tsar hears calls for transparency’, South China Morning Post, , 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1096511/anti-corruption-tsar-hears-calls-transparency, date 
accessed 31 May 2013. 
10 Economist (2013a) ‘A corruption fighter: Calling Fire Chief Wang’, The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21574022-wang-qishan-has-one-crucial-advantage-fighting-
corruption-calling-fire-chief-wang, date accessed 31 May 2013. 
11 Irish Times (2013) Clifford Coonan, ‘Communist officials sidestep Xi’s anti-corruption efforts’, The 
Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/communist-officials-sidestep-xi-s-anti-
corruption-efforts-1.1380894, date accessed 30 May 2013.  
12 Zheng Zhixue (2013) ‘Renqing “xianzheng” de benzhi’,  
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0529/c83855-21652535.html (accessed, 29 May 2013). 
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Leninism system China under Xi will seek to use precision or well-focused repression and 
inducements to eliminate or neutralize challenges to the Party as soon as such challenges are 
detected. This should pre-empt or reduce the need to resort to dramatic large scale or 
summary repression.  It does not mean that summary repression as a tactic will not be applied 
if the top leadership should see a challenge to the security and unity of the state. This applies 
not only in the western regions with a heavy concentration of minorities but also to the rest of 
the country. The perceived rise of a serious terrorist challenge of the Islamist nature in 
Xinjiang following a series of bombings in Urumqi in the spring of 2014 is likely to result in 
the wider use of summary, rather than precision, repression there.13 But precision repression 
remains the preferred option in the rest of the country. 
 
Enhancing Governance  
 
 Consultative Leninism promotes ‘good governance with Chinese characteristics’. 
What this means needs to be contextualized. ‘Chineseness’ in this formulation should not be 
confused with traditional Chinese culture or the original Confucian values. The traditional 
Chinese concept of ‘the ideal government… is one which is efficient, fair, honest and 
paternalistic, yet non-intrusive vis-à-vis the life of the ordinary people’.14 The last 
requirement contradicts the basic nature of the Party as a Leninist institution, which is about 
proactively leading, directing and mobilizing the general population to support all aspects of 
development as the Party sees fit.  
 
In defining good governance with Chinese characteristics the Party looks back into 
                                              
13  China (2014b) Xinhua, ‘President Xi vows severe punishment on terrorists’, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-05/22/content_32460524.htm, date accessed 2 June 2014. 
14 Steve Tsang (ed.) (1995) A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press), p. 5. 
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both its own relatively short history and China’s long history for inspiration. It also examines 
ideas and experience from outside of China as it constructs an alternative to democratization 
that is suited to the ‘special conditions of China’. In Xi’s words ‘with regard to our cultural 
tradition and those from outside the country, we must make the old serve the present and 
those originating in the West useful for China’ today.15 Thus, while Xi advocates a revival of 
the Confucian tradition Leninism – a Russian import – is deemed no less Chinese for this 
purpose.  
 
A particularly important set of lessons Xi insists on the Party learning are that from 
the implosion of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.16 Xi felt that the most 
essential one was that nobody in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) ‘was man 
enough to stand up and resist’ the like of Mikhail Gorbachev.17 Since he took office Xi has 
stressed the importance of returning to traditional Leninist discipline to pre-empt the risk of 
the Party following the fate of the CPSU.18 The Party has further examined the experience of 
the ‘Asian tiger economies’ under authoritarian rule, particularly that of Singapore.19 The 
final product is, however, what the Party chooses to put together regardless of their origins, 
which it labels as a distinctly modern Chinese approach. The Party’s definition of what is 
Chinese is meant to be final. 
 
                                              
15 CPC People (2013) Renmin Ribao and Xí Jinping, ‘Xionghuai daju bawo dashi zhuoyan dashi nuli 
ba xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo zuode genghao’, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0821/c64094-
22636876.html, date accessed 27 Aug. 2015. 
16 Joseph Fewsmith (2001) China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 52-3. 
17 China Digital Times (2013) ‘Leaked Speech Shows Xi Jinping’s Opposition to Reform’, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/01/leaked-speech-shows-xi-jinpings-opposition-to-reform/, date 
accessed 3 June 2013. 
18 NY Times (2013) Chris Buckley, ‘Vows of Change in China Belie Private Warning’, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/world/asia/vowing-reform-chinas-leader-xi-jinping-airs-other-
message-in-private.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, date accessed 31 May 2013. 
19 Chen Feng (1993) ‘Xinjiapo Remin Xindongdang minzhu shehuizhuyi mowu jichi jiejian yiyi’, Guoji 
Gongyun Shi Yanjiu, no.1, p. 5-10. 
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 The instrument to deliver good governance is the Party itself.  As such it requires 
constant reform and updating. The Party seeks to do so by ‘promoting a new generation of 
leaders, reformulating its ideological content, appealing to nationalist impulses in society, 
strengthening its organizational apparatus throughout the country, and opening the channels 
of discourse within the party and between the party-state and society.’20 Such an approach, 
which is reinforced by increasing institutionalization and merit based promotion, has 
continued under Xi. 
 
 More specifically the Party has introduced reforms in the political arena aimed at 
enhancing its own capacity and that of the state to govern effectively. The Party uses ‘a mix 
of measures to shore up popular support, resolve local protests, and incorporate the 
beneficiaries of economic reform into the political system’.21 After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang 
Zemin the Party quietly started to re-emphasize selectively some Maoist ideas or practices, 
for example, the principle of democratic centralism.22 Hu saw a greater need for the Party to 
deliver social justice in order to pre-empt discontent in the countryside from developing into 
a major source of instability23. Hu publicly advocated that the Party should ‘devote 
themselves in building a government "by the people, for the people", and one that ensures all 
Chinese enjoy the fruits of the country's economic development’.24 He took the view that ‘the 
biggest danger to the Party … has been losing touch with the masses’ and the Party leadership 
must therefore ‘focus on the core issue of the inextricable link between the Party and the 
                                              
20 David Shambaugh (2008) China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washignton DC: 
Woodrew Wilson Center Press), p. 9. 
21 Bruce Dickson (2005) ‘Populist Authoritarianism: China’s Domestic Political Scebe’, China’s 
Communist Party, p. 37. 
22 Wang Yang (2006) Xin shiqi Dang de ganbu zhidu jianshe (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi  
chubanshe), p. 354. 
23 David Shambaugh (2008) China’s Communist Party, p. 114-5. 
24 English People (2008) ‘Chinese president urges improved public service in gov't’, 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6359481.html, date accessed 2 June 2014.  
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masses’.25 Xi has embraced this approach with a vengeance. Xi is not promoting a full scale 
Maoist restoration.  Xi can see how effective some of the Maoist mobilization and 
propaganda methods were and intends to make the most of them. Xi and his cohort who, in 
an important sense, inherited power from their parents are not apologetic about their 
inheritance and are comfortable using Maoist methods as they see fit. 
 
Increasing institutionalization  
 
Consultative Leninism relies on institutionalization to make Chinese politics less 
volatile. The most important achievement in this regard is the introduction of an 
institutionalized way to manage succession. When Jiang Zemin’s ‘third generation’ leadership 
handed over to Hu Jintao’s ‘fourth generation’ leaders in 2002-3 it was the first time that an 
heir-apparent successfully took over as planned. This is a significant landmark as all 
previously anointed successors, from Liu Shaoqi to Zhao Ziyang ended their careers in 
dramatic and in most cases tragic circumstances. Hu’s relatively uneventfully succession to 
Jiang set a precedent.  
 
This practice was followed and indeed strengthened at the 18th Party Congress a 
decade later. On this occasion, Hu passed on both the offices of General Secretary of the 
Party and the Chair of the Central Military Commission to Xi and formally retired.  In 
contrast, his predecessor Jiang hung on to the latter position for two years after relinquishing 
the Party leadership in 2002. 2012-13 was also the first time in the history of the PRC when 
the new party chairman and premier emerged from an agreement reached in the previous 
Party Congress five years earlier, and was not the result of having been anointed by a 
                                              
25 Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley (eds.) (2002) China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files (London: 
Granta Books), p. 193-4. 
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strongman. Even by the standards of the post-Mao era this is a major landmark, as Deng had 
in fact anointed three direct and one indirect successor. Among those directly anointed, 
namely Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, only the last completed his term of 
office without having been removed by fiat. The indirect successor was Hu Jintao himself. 
 
Despite all the drama and rumours that appeared in the media ahead of the 18th Party 
Congress (2012) and the intensity of tough bargaining behind the scene, the politics of 
succession has become sufficiently institutionalized that it is now nearly predictable, at least 
for the headship of the Party and of the State Council. The old practice of the paramount 
leader anointing a successor has now been replaced by a new one, which is still at the early 
stage of being institutionalized. It involves the existing top leadership collectively choosing 
their key successors and placing them in apprenticeship for five years before ascending to the 
top offices, as General Secretary of the Party and Premier of the state. The handing over of 
power is not democratic in the Western sense but it is structured, stable and basically 
predictable – indeed, much more predictable than possible in a democratic system. As a 
political system consultative Leninism supports collective leadership with an identifiable top 
leader but limits (though it cannot eliminate) the scope for the rise of a strongman. 
 
At the third plenum of 2013, Xi strengthened the institutionalization of policy making 
on the most important challenges the PRC will face by creating two new top level agencies.  
The first is the State Security Council (SSC). The other is the Leading Small Group for 
Deepening Reform (LSGDR).  By taking charge of them personally Xi ensures that he, as the 
leader of both the Party and the country, coordinates and directs the most important policy 
issues. While Xi has already proved that he is a more assertive and powerful leader than Hu 
after only one year in office, he is apparently seeking to exercise such authority through the 
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two new institutions rather than asserting himself by fiat as a strongman normally would. 
 
Although details on how the two new agencies work in practice are not yet available, 
it is almost certain that the SSC will be responsible for both internal and external security.  
Whether internal or external security takes precedent is a moot point, as both are essential for 
the legitimacy and continuation of the Party in power. Internal security will in reality take 
precedent mainly because the PRC does not face any external threat in the foreseeable future 
whereas the risk of an internal threat cannot be eliminated fully. Xi’s awareness of the vital 
significance of internal security was fully revealed in his stress of the need to pre-empt the 
rise of a Gorbarchev figure and of his commitment to tighten control over the media and 
dissidents. In December 2013, the Party issued new guidelines to strengthen management of 
the media. This was intended to ‘bolstering core socialist values and pooling positive energy 
to realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation’.26 This focus on domestic security was 
reinforced by the introduction, in parallel, of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) a 
month earlier.  Given the implications for China’s relations with its neighbours and the rest of 
the world, it was impossible for the ADIZ to have been introduced without Xi’s approval, 
though there is no evidence to suggest this was the first act of the SSC. The pushback from 
China’s neighbours to the ADIZ underlines the importance for setting up a top level co-
ordinating body for state security. The SSC is undoubtedly intended to fulfil such a purpose 
in co-ordinating all relevant government and party organs to ensure matters of state security 
are implemented in accordance with the decisions of the top leadership. 
 
Xi’s taking charge of the LSGDR was formally announced at the end of 2013, and this 
confirmed Xi’s commitment to use the Party as the key instrument to take reform forward. 
                                              
26 Xinhua Net (2013a) ‘China Focus: China promotes core socialist values’, 




The most notable change thus introduced is to assign this portfolio not to the Premier, who is 
primarily responsible for managing the economy, but to the Party General Secretary, whose 
primary focus is politics and setting the general direction for development. This represents 
either a diminishing of the Premiership or a new emphasis on reform not being primarily a 
technical matter of managing the economy. It is easy to see this as reflecting the former, 
implying a factional seizure of power since Xi and Premier Li Keqiang do not share the same 
factional power base.27 However, there is no sign of serious tension between Xi and Li over 
this new arrangement.  It is more likely that the change reflects a re-emphasize on the 
Leninist tradition of the Party, in line with the trend since the 18th Party Congress.  As far as 
can be ascertained General Secretary Xi is taking personal charge to ensure the Party will 
greatly strengthen its own capacity to deepen reform by first imposing tight discipline on 
party members, with Li keeping his position as the number two ranking leader in the Party. It 
implies that the top leadership under Xi intends a reinvigorated party to take the lead and 
direct the next stage of reform – in tune with consultative Leninist system.28    
 
Strengthening consultative capacity 
 
The Party’s formal commitment to and its assertion that it already practises 
‘democracy’ needs to be put in context. ‘Socialist democracy’ in China requires electoral 
outcomes to be predictable and to deliver results approved by the Party beforehand. The chief 
mechanism the Party relies on to secure this is the principle of democratic centralism, which 
governs ‘intra-party democracy’. Under Xi this mechanism is to be reinforced by ‘the mass 
                                              
27 SCMP (2013) Gary Huang, ‘Xi Jinping to head reform panel, taking another role from premier’, 
South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1393479/xi-jinping-head-reform-
panel-taking-another-role-premier, date accessed 31 December 2013.  
28 Xinhua Net (2013b) ‘Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju jueding chengli zhongyang quanmian 
shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu’, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-12/30/c_118771223.htm, 
date accessed 30 December 2013.  
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line’, based on the Maoist principle of ‘from the masses and to the masses’. In essence this 
means the Party must go to the masses or ‘patriotic citizens’ to collect and collate ideas from 
them, then organize and otherwise add new input to produce a coherent and constructive set 
of policies and then take them back to the masses, educate and otherwise induce the masses 
to embrace such ideas as their own.29 As far as the Party is concerned its leadership ‘is a 
fundamental guarantee for the Chinese people to be masters in managing the affairs of their 
own country’.30  
 
Consultative Leninism is meant to pre-empt democratization as the term is understood 
by political scientists in the West.  What it is designed to deliver is ‘consultative democracy’.  
This is deemed ‘a special advantage that China enjoys under socialist democracy’, and a 
‘manifestation of the mass line’. 31  As it is explained in a Third Plenum document, ‘policy 
decisions are not made and implemented without first conducting widespread consultation 
under the leadership of the Party, which will focus on the important problems of socio-
economic development, and bear in mind the practical issues of the interests of the masses.’32 
Under Xi, the Party is committed to resurrect fully the mass-line.  
 
It should not be assumed that deepening the Party’s version of ‘consultative 
democracy’ that includes the re-introduction of some Maoist practices is incompatible with 
features commonly seen in democratization. Indeed, the Party is interested not only in 
                                              
29 Tony Saich (2004) Governance and Politics of China, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 
44.  
The concept of ‘the masses’ is essentially a Maoist concept. The nearest meaning to such a term is 
‘patriotic’ citizens, with the Communist Party holding the right to define what ‘patriotic’ means. The 
issue of patriotism is examined further towards the end of this paper. 
30 Kerry Brown (2011) Ballot Box China: Grassroots Democracy in the Final Major One-party State 
(London & New York: Zed Books), p. 40. 
31 Xinhua Net (2013c) ‘Shouquan fabu: Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhongyang quanmian shenhua 
gaige ruoganzhongda wenti de jueding’, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-




expanding good governance practices but also in allowing for a greater scope for civil 
liberties and for political participation for the overwhelming majority of the citizenry.  
Dissidents who are deemed by the Party as subversive of the national interest are excluded.  
Indeed, they have their scope to do so more tightly restricted than previously, as the Party 
itself becomes more effective as an instrument to govern under Xi. But the number of 
dissidents in China who fall into such a category is a small fraction of the total population. 
 
In terms of greater political participation the most important general elections in 
China are not those for the National People’s Congress but for the Communist Party’s 
national congress. At the 17th Party Congress, held in October 2007, the party leadership 
allowed 15% of nominees to fail to get elected.33 At the 18th Party Congress of November 
2012, 9.3% of those nominated for Central Committee membership were required to accept 
‘electoral’ defeat, whereas the percentage was set at the higher figure of 11.3% for those 
nominated as alternate members of the Central Committee.34 The Chinese government also 
experimented with township level elections since the turn of the century on the basis of 
experimentation with village level elections introduced since the 1980s.35 Such developments 
do not amount to genuine democratic exercises as defined in the West, since the Party can and 
generally does secure its desired electoral outcomes, but they do enlarge the scope for 
election.36    
                                              
33 John L. Thornton (2008) ‘Long Time Coming: Prospect for Democracy in China’, Foreign Affairs, 
vol.87, no.1, p. 8-9. 
34 China (2012a) Xinhua, ‘New China Party leadership elected’, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/14/content_27108963.htm, date accessed 
31 May 2013. 
35 Tianjian Shi (2000) ‘Economic Development and Village Elections in Rural China’ in Suisheng Zhao 
(ed.), China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China (New York: 
Routledge), p. 244-6. 
36 Deliberative and incremental steps in increasing the element of election are part of democratization. 
In the case of Taiwan, for example, local elections from the 1950s onwards helped the 
democratization process once the Kuomintang authoritarian regime under Chiang Ching-kuo accepted 
the need to democratize in the late 1980s, even though such elections in the 1950s were not 




 The Party has also made a point in consulting individuals and organizations outside 
itself than before. Important gestures underlining the Party and the government’s commitment 
to do so range from reaffirming the right of existing consultative institutions to criticize 
specific government policies to the use of the new media as an opinion forum, to allowing 
greater scope for civil society to operate.37 Indeed, the Party revived the Chinese People’s 
Consultative Political Conference (CPPCC), which includes other political parties, as an 
institution of consultation. As such the CPPCC is now asked by top level leaders like Yu 
Zhengsheng ‘to better exert its role as a political consultative body’.38 Non-Communist 
individuals of considerable personal achievements have also been co-opted to join the central 
government. Dr Wan Gang, President of Tongji University, has consequently served as 
Minister of Science and Technology since 2007. Likewise, Dr Chen Zhu, a haematologist and 
Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was appointed Minister of Health from 
2007 to 2013. Although such appointments represent primarily the application of a classic 
United Front idea to ‘attract outstanding individuals from all over for the cause of the Party 
and country’, it was a significant step in strengthening the non-exclusive element of 
consultative Leninism.39 
 
As to the new media, which can be important instruments for undermining 
authoritarian regimes, the Chinese authorities not only monitor and control them vigorously 
but also adopt them for consultation or reaching out to the masses. Starting in 2007 the State 
Council has used its official website to collect opinions on draft laws and regulations. Even 
                                              
37 For enlarging the scope for civil society, see discussions below regarding the rescue and relief 
efforts during the Sichuan earthquake of 2008. 
38 People Daily (2013) Xinhua, ‘CPPCC urged to play bigger role’, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/8187228.html, date accessed 2 June 2014.  
39 China (2012b) ‘Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress’, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_12.htm, date 
accessed 2 June 2014. 
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top leaders prefer to project an image that they can be accessible via the new media. When he 
was Premier, Wen Jiabao maintained a presence on Facebook.40  As General Secretary of the 
Party Hu Jintao held online discussions in the Renmin Ribao’s ‘strong country forum’ in 
2008.41 Xi Jinping approached this differently.  In an importance sense he went further by 
allowing photographs of him buying and eating a meal of steamed buns and sharing a table 
with citizens of Beijing in a local restaurant being circulated on Weibo, before it was 
showcased on Xinhuanet in late 2013.42 
 
 With regard to non-government organization (NGO) the Party under Xi is keen to 
ensure the Party plays a leadership role in directing the efforts of NGOs. The approach 
adopted is to treat NGOs collectively like a bird in a cage. The Party is prepared to enlarge 
the cage as it sees fit but a cage is nonetheless maintained. This is to give NGOs sufficient 
scope to operate in the non-critical realm while its ambition to extend its scope to the critical 




 In reiterating the Party’s commitment to deepen reform and rebalance the economy, 
Xi has acted in line with the requirement of consultative Leninism and adhered to economic 
pragmatism. The ‘bird cage approach’ for managing the economy, as expounded by party 
                                              
40 Wen’s Facebook (2009) http://en-gb.facebook.com/pages/-Wen-Jia-bao/13823116911, date 
accessed 12 February 2009. 
41 Danwei (2008) ‘Online chat with Hu Jintao’, Danwei, 
http://www.danwei.org/internet/president_hu_jintao_talks_to_n.php, date assessed 2 
June 2014. 
42 Xinhua Net (2013d) ‘Xi Jingping paidui mai baozi,jizi maidan duanpanzi’, 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2013_12/28/32553245_0.shtml, date accessed 31 December 
2013.  
43 Although the term ‘civil society’ is among seven concepts that are now required not to be used in 
universities, NGOs are not in fact banned under Xi. Global Voices (2014) Oiwan Lam, ‘Chinese 
Government Bans Seven ‘Speak-Not’ Subjects’, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/05/16/chinese-
government-bans-seven-speak-not-school-subjects/, date accessed 2 January 2014. 
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elder Chen Yun in the Dengist period, is still practised, though the cage has already been 
enlarged so much that it is not normally noticeable to most ordinary Chinese citizens.  The 
basic principle remains that the Party will enlarge the cage as long as the performance of the 
bird (or the economy) justifies it and it is safe to do so.  But the Party will reduce the cage 
should it become necessary to sustain the consultative Leninist system in place. A key 
limitation of this approach is that it is essentially a blunt instrument, as reducing the size of 
the cage invariably causes unintended consequences. This being the case, the enlargement of 
the cage has only been allowed in a carefully calibrated incremental basis. The scale of 
changes so far is the result of over 30 years of carefully managed expansion. 
 
 Notwithstanding the dramatic transformation over three decades of reform China’s 
economy is still, by design, not a free market one though it is also no longer a command 
economy. It is a mixed one where private capital now has huge scope to invest in almost 
whatever it deems the most profitable lines of manufacturing, trade or service provision. It is 
also one where state or publicly owned enterprises enjoy great privileges and government 
patronage, and are still subject to government direction. In a nutshell the Party has enlarged 
the bird cage so much that the bird has largely developed without finding itself seriously 
constrained by the cage most of the time. But the cage has not been and will not be removed.  
 
 As Xi leads the way to re-work the strategy to rebalance the economy in the coming 
decade, he is exploring ways to manage the bird cage in a smarter way. There is no doubt that 
under Xi the Party will continue to consult the country’s best economists and others with the 
requisite expertise, but the Leninist nature of the Party will also assert itself.  The creation of 
the LSGDR should strengthen the capacity of the Party to control and enable it take bolder 
steps forward in rebalancing the economy. This was reflected in the Third Plenum’s 
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commitment to allow the market to play not just a ‘basic’ but ‘a decisive role in resource 
allocation’ in order to ‘give better play to the role of government’.44 
 
 To rebalance the economy essentially means that it needs to make the economy much 
more efficient as well as less dependent on growth driven by export and infrastructural 
investments, and more dependent on domestic consumption and the market.  This is not a 
new recognition. When he was Premier, Wen Jiabao publicly acknowledged this.  What are 
needed are:  
(i) widening the social safety net and raising household incomes and, ultimately, 
consumption; 
(ii) removing the distortions in relative prices – mainly in the exchange rate and input 
costs – to exploit real comparative advantages and make the model more robust;  
(iii)reducing the government’s interference in the allocation of resources; and  
(iv) liberalizing the financial system, which would allow for a more efficient and effective 
intermediation of savings.45 
What is getting more pressing is for the Chinese Government to deal with the debt problems 
that mushroomed as a corollary of the economic stimulus packages since the global financial 
crisis threatened China.  A majority of the loans taken out for this purpose that has matured 
has only been rolled over, not repaid.46 They will need to be settled in the next few years. 
What it will take to rebalance the economy is not unknown to the Party. The difficulty is in 
implementing them without putting the stability of the system at risk.  
 
                                              
44 English People (2013) Xinhua, ‘China's emphasis on market's 'decisive' role to boost economic 
efficiency’, http://english.people.com.cn/business/8456596.html, date accessed 1 January 2014. 
45 Ettore Dorrucci, Gabor Pula and Daniel Santabárbara (2013) China’s Economic Growth and 
Rebalancing (ECB Occasional Paper 142), p. 45. 
46 Financial Times (2013) Simon Rabinovitch, ‘China confident it aced local debt audit exam’, The 
Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88b02c30-71c3-11e3-adbd-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2p9GgH0wJ, date accessed 1 January 2014. 
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Whether under Xi’s leadership, the consultative Leninist system will be able to do 
what Hu and Wen failed to deliver in this regard in the previous decade remains to be seen. 
Xi has chosen to strengthen the Party and his grip over it as the prerequisite in this endeavour. 
What is being put in place is a capacity to manage the enlargement of the birdcage in a 
smarter way.  The intention is to enlarge the birdcage substantially but not in every direction, 
so that the market can indeed play a ‘decisive role’ but without posing a threat to the integrity 
of the consultative Leninist system.   
 
Nationalism as the new ideology 
 
The last defining feature of consultative Leninism is the promotion of nationalism as 
the ideological force that binds the country together under the leadership of the Party.  Xi is a 
nationalist.  His advocacy of the China dream takes the Party sponsorship of nationalism to a 
level higher than hitherto. But in so doing he is merely reinforcing an existing trend. This 
process started as Communism in effect ceased to function as the state ideology after 1989. It 
was in part a reaction to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as the Chinese 
establishment feared social and national disintegration following ‘the decline of the 
traditional ideology’.47 It was also because the Party intended to pre-empt Western values and 
beliefs from captivating Chinese citizens living in an ideological void.48 With consultative 
Leninism replacing the strongman politics of Deng Xiaoping, the promotion of this new 
ideological binding force was essential to keep the system function effectively. Xi Jinping 
seeks to use ‘traditional faiths in the hope these will help fill a [moral] vacuum created by the 
country's breakneck growth and rush to get rich’.49 
                                              
47 Zheng Yongnian (1999) Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 51. 
48 Chen Shaoming (1996) ‘Minzu zhuyi: Fuxing zhi dao’, Dong Fang, no.2, p. 74. 




The choice of nationalism as the new though informal state ideology is meant to 
enhance the Party’s capacity to stay in power on two mutually reinforcing ways. It is to 
provide a new basis for legitimacy and to serve as a new rallying force to develop a national 
aspiration around the leadership of the Party. After 1989 the Party ‘moved quickly to position 
themselves as the defenders of China’s national pride’ and unity.50 The historical narrative 
chosen for this purpose is a pan-Chinese one. It is, however, based on a Han-centric view of 
the history of greater China. The nationalism thus promoted encourages Chinese nationals to 
identify with a rising China under the leadership of the Party in juxtaposition against the West 
that is portrayed as uncomfortable with China’s resurgence and historic unity.51  
 
This has not been diminished under Xi despite his commitment to defend the Maoist 
heritage of the Party and the PRC, which should not be confused with an attempt to revive 
Communism as the state ideology. On the contrary Xi uses nationalism, not Maoism, as the 
ideological base for the Party’s legitimacy.  Within a month of his elevation, Xi explained to 
sailors in Guangzhou that the China dream was about national revival, and it was about both 
the building of a strong country and powerful armed forces that should be totally loyal to the 
Party.52 His invocation of national victimhood in China’s ‘century of humiliation’ has led to 
foreign observers seeing him as unashamedly appealing to emotion.53 As elaborated in the 
                                                                                                                                            
fill moral void in China’, Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/29/us-china-politics-vacuum-
idUSBRE98S0GS20130929, date accessed 2 June 2014. 
50 Zhao Suisheng (2005-6) ‘China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?’ The Washington 
Quarterly, vol.29, no.1, p.134. 
51 The large public outburst of nationalism when the Olympic torch relay outside of China met with 
large scale public protests in April 2008. For a strong representation of some Chinese nationalists’ 
frustrations, see China Digital Times (2008) ‘My Friends, What Do You Want From Us?’, China Digital 
Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/04/my-friends-what-do-you-want-from-us/, date accessed 2 
June 2014. 
52 BBS (2012) Xinhua, ‘Xi Jinping kaocha Nanhai jiandui, guanmo junyan yu guanbing gongjin wucan’, 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_6465710_1.html, date accessed 31 May 2013. 
53 Economist (2013b) ‘Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream’, The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-
people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping, date accessed 31 May 2013. 
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Party’s theoretical journal, Qiushi, the China dream is about ‘merging the dreams of 
individual with the dream of the country, of the nation, and of the people, and to put the 
interest of the individual, of the country, of the nation and of the people together as a 
whole’.54 This focus on national revival in Xi’s China dream suggests that he is even more 
committed than his predecessor to use nationalism as the state ideology to galvanize the 
country in support of consultative Leninism. 
 
 Under Xi the Party continues to use an extensive propaganda and educational 
campaign to indoctrinate the people in patriotism. It is one that requires the citizens of the 
PRC to participate in affirming ‘the rightness and acceptability of the state, its values, 
policies and agencies’.55 The core of this campaign is to emphasize ‘how China’s unique 
national conditions make it unsuitable to adopt Western style liberal democracy’ and how 
China’s existing political system helps to ‘maintain political stability, a prerequisite for rapid 
economic development’.56 By ‘[r]einforcing China’s national confidence and turning past 
humiliation and current weakness into a driving force for China’s modernization’ the Party 
has transformed nationalism into ‘an effective instrument for enhancing [its] legitimacy’.57 
The intention is to instil in the mind of the Chinese people a sense of pride in China and its 
development that is inseparable from the leadership of the Party or a strong feeling of ‘my 
government right or wrong’. The pursuit of the China dream and the sustaining of the 
consultative Leninist system require this. 
 
Conclusions 
                                              
54 QS Theory (2013) Zhongguo shenhuikexue yuan Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi lilun tixiyanjiu 
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2013.  
55 David Kelly (2006) ‘Citizen Movements and China’s Public Intellectuals in the Hu-Wen Era’, Pacific 
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Xi Jinping clearly intends to leave his marks. Since he assumed power, he has 
embraced consultative Leninism as the basis to build the China dream. All the indications so 
far are that he will develop the potential of the consultative Leninist system to the full.  Xi 
has shown that he appreciates the advantages of this system. It gives China arguably as 
resilient a political system as it can have without democracy. The resilience is rooted in the 
capacity to control inherent in what remains an essentially Leninist political machinery. It is 
strengthened by incorporating various consultative elements and a new ideology that has 
much more ready appeal than Communism. By modernizing the regime’s capabilities to 
monitor and direct public opinion and instil a sense of patriotic duty on its citizens to support 
the government, the Party has built up a significant capacity to deflect public discontent away 
from itself. By enhancing its ability to detect challenges as they emerge and remove most of 
them, either by co-optation or by relatively well-focused repression, before they become 
major threats to the system, consultative Leninism lowers the need to resort to large scale 
summary repression. This, in turn, reduces exposure to risks that can destabilize the system in 
a fundamental way. 
 
Xi is committed to make the consultative Leninist system work better. He understands 
that it is not a static system but one that needs to adapt to the changing environment so that 
the Party will stay in power and direct China’s development. The big differences between his 
approach and that of Hu Jintao lies in his willingness to drive the Party much harder to make 
the China dream a reality within a decade, and to take risk. Xi appears ambitious and driven. 
He articulates confidence in the system’s ability to form the foundation for China to secure its 
re-emergence as a great power of the first league. He seeks to do so by reinvigorating the 
Party so that it can perform as a Leninist instrument for control and for directing the next 
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stage of reform as well as for reaching out to the masses more effectively. The launch of the 
anti-corruption drive after the 18th Congress was but the first step in this process. Xi is 
committed to further strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of the Party, the state 
apparatus and the armed forces, such as the 2015 plan to reduce 300,000 officers and other 
ranks from the PLA in order to streamline its organization and strengthen its combat 
readiness. 
 
As Xi asserts himself as the new leader of China he has not behaved like a strong man 
but acted in line with the consultative Leninist political system, which favours an 
institutionalized collective leadership. In dealing with highly sensitive and potentially 
divisive issues, such as the bringing of the disgraced former Politburo member Bo Xilai to 
trial and in the investigations into alleged misdeeds of the retired Politburo Standing 
Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Xi has moved with great deliberation. There is little 
doubt that Xi is in the driving seat but he has apparently not imposed his will on his 
colleagues in the Politburo and its Standing Committee in a way that would provoke an 
immediate backlash. What Xi has so far demonstrated is an attempt to lead from the front and 
yet preserve a collective leadership. He also seeks to institutionalize this by the creation of 
the SSC and the LSGDR. Xi will stay the course, but whether vested interests will attempt to 
fight back remains to be seen. 
 
As consultative Leninism consolidates and the Party under Xi gains further in 
confidence and competence, it is likely to take bolder steps to deepen reform. It should imply 
greater scope being given to NGOs and private citizens to operate as long as they pose no 
challenge to the Party while dissidents’ scope to articulate themselves will be restricted more 
tightly.  Reinvigoration of specific Maoist or highly modified Confucian ideas will be 
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adopted where the Party believes they can enhance its ability to govern or improve its moral 
authority. But they will not lead to a full scale restoration of either Maoism or Confucianism 
as the state ideology. The bottom line remains unchanged – the dominance of the Party, even 
if intra-party reforms, such as greater ‘inner party democracy’ may appear to make the top 
leader more responsive to others than his predecessors. Indeed, the increased scope for debate 
among party leaders is one of the means through which the Party enhances consultative 
Leninism and improves on its development model. Xi will also maximize the value of the 
mass-line and associated consultative elements to strengthen the Party’s capacity to reach out 
to the masses. These considerations will drive political development in China that is meant to 
deliver a national rejuvenation in the coming decade. 
 
